Too Many, Too Slow The Bush administration's stockpile reduction plan.

## Table 2: U.S. Nuclear Forces (2012) (NRDC Estimate)

Туре	WHs per Launcher	Launchers Deployed			Inactive	Total			
				Deplo	yed	Reserve			
		Operational	Overhaul	Operational	Overhaul	& Spares	Active		
Strategic I	Forces:								
ICBMs									
MM-III									
W78	1	200		200		203			403
W87	1	300		300		247			547
Subtotal (ICBM)		500	0	500	0	450	950	0	950
	9	1	,	,	,	1	1	,	,
SSBN		12	2						
SLBM									
W76	5	216	48	1080	240	522			1842
W88	5	72	0	360		44			404

Subtotal (SLBM)		288	48	1440	240	566	2246	0	2246
Strategic Boml	pers:								
B-52H	16	56	20						
B-2	16	16	5						
B61-7				70		145		218	433
B61-11				20				15	35
B83-0								300	300
B83-1				80		243			323
W80-1 (ACM/ ALCM)				90		735			825
Subtotal (Strategic Bombers)		72	25	260	0	1123	1383	533	1916
Subtotal (Strategic)				2200	240	2139	4579	533	5112
Non-Strategic	Forces:								
F-16C/D									
F-15E	1	1		(	1	1			
B-61-3				200					200
B-61-4				200					200
B-61-10				180					180

SLCM/ W80-0		100				164	264
Subtotal (Non- strategic)		680	0	0	680	164	844
Total Warheads		2880	240	2139	5259	697	5956

- The reductions would take eight years to implement -- two presidential terms from now. They could be accelerated and achieved well before 2012. Of course there is a limit as to the number of disassemblies that can be accomplished annually at the Pantex plant, where a large-scale program is underway to extend the service life of several warhead types. The Energy Department likely would remove warheads from active status and store them in Defense Department depots before sending them to Pantex.
- While Russia has been dismantling nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, it too has retained excessive numbers, largely to counterbalance the U.S. stockpile. The Bush administration has not taken advantage of an opportunity to challenge the Russians to follow its lead. The time is ripe for Russia to reciprocate and announce detailed plans about its arsenal and commensurate reductions. This would require greater openness on both sides.
- The prior impending requirement for the resumption of tritium production (to avoid dipping into emergency reserve stocks of tritium to maintain the arsenal) has now been pushed out by about five years. (Tritium is a hydrogen isotope in gas form that is used to "boost" fission weapons, making them more efficient. Tritium has a half-life of 12.3 years and must be replenished periodically for the weapon to work to its design specification. Tritium was produced in the reactors at Savannah River but since they were shut down existing stocks have been used from retired weapons to supply active weapons.)
- The administration continues to impose unwarranted Cold War levels of secrecy regarding the changes it is making in the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile's active and reserve components. This secrecy makes it difficult for Russia and China to clearly understand U.S. nuclear intentions, and inhibits an open public debate about the Energy Department's tritium and plutonium pit production requirements.