Case 1:05-cv-01207-LJO-EPG Document 988 Filed 11/09/15 Page 1 of 33 1 KATHERINE POOLE (SBN 195010) DOUGLAS ANDREW OBEGI (SBN 246127) 2 NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 111 Sutter Street, 20th Floor 3 San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: (415) 875-6100 Facsimile: (415) 875-6161 4 kpoole@nrdc.org; dobegi@nrdc.org 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff NRDC 6 HAMILTON CANDEE (SBN 111376) 7 BARBARA JANE CHISHOLM (SBN 224656) TONY LOPRESTI (SBN 289269) 8 ALTSHULER BERZON LLP 177 Post St., Suite 300 9 San Francisco, CA 94108 Telephone: (415) 421-7151 10 Facsimile: (415) 362-8064 hcandee@altber.com; bchisholm@altber.com; tlopresti@altber.com 11 Attorneys for Plaintiff NRDC 12 TRENT W. ORR (SBN 77656) 13 EARTHJUSTICE 50 California St. Suite 500 14 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 217-2000 Facsimile: (415) 217-2040 15 torr@earthjustice.org 16 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and proposed Plaintiffs 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 18 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 19 20 NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE Case No. 1:05-cv-01207 LJO-EPG COUNCIL, et al., 21 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND **AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF** Plaintiffs, 22 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL v. 23 **COMPLAINT** SALLY JEWELL, U.S. Department of the 24 **TBD** Interior, et al., Date: Time: TBD 25 Defendants. Ctrm: 4 Judge: Lawrence J. O'Neill 26 27 28

Case 1:05-cv-01207-LJO-EPG Document 988 Filed 11/09/15 Page 2 of 33 SAN LUIS & DELTA MENDOTA WATER AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants-Intervenors. ANDERSON-COTTONWOOD IRRIGATION DISTRICT, et al., Joined Parties.

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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs seek the Court's leave to supplement their complaint against the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") and the Sacramento River Settlement ("SRS") Contractors to address ongoing violations of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") that imperil the survival and recovery of two salmon species indigenous to the Sacramento River and its tributaries. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties may supplement pleadings "to promote as complete an adjudication of the dispute between the parties as possible by allowing the addition of claims which arise after the initial pleadings are filed." *William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.*, 668 F.2d 1014, 1057 (9th Cir. 1982); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(d). Recent developments in this litigation and in the implementation of the renewed SRS contracts give rise to Plaintiffs' proposed claims. The filing of the Proposed Fourth Supplemental Complaint ("4SC") will promote a comprehensive resolution of the disputes surrounding the SRS contracts and avoid wasteful and inefficient litigation of related matters in separate, duplicative cases.

On June 15, 2015, the Court stayed this litigation to allow Reclamation to reinitiate consultation on the renewals of the SRS contracts and other contracts at issue in this case. Reclamation subsequently requested reinitiation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") on the impacts of the SRS contract renewals upon delta smelt but did not request reinitiation with the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") on the impacts of the same contract renewals on the endangered Sacramento River winter-run Chinook salmon ("winter-run Chinook") and the threatened Central Valley spring-run Chinook salmon ("spring-run Chinook"), even though such reinitiation is required under Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2), and the ESA's implementing regulations, 50 C.F.R. §402.16. Because Reclamation has refused Plaintiffs' requests that it reinitiate consultation with NMFS as well as FWS, Plaintiffs seek to add a claim to require Reclamation's compliance with the ESA.

Plaintiffs also seek to add a related claim challenging Reclamation's and the SRS Contractors' ongoing violations of Section 9 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. §1538, for illegal "take" of ESA-listed winter-run and spring-run Chinook that has occurred each of the last two years as a result of the implementation of the renewed SRS contracts. In 2014, Reclamation made excessive

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deliveries to the SRS Contractors that depleted the cold water reserves in Shasta Reservoir,
causing temperature increases that were fatal to the winter-run and spring-run Chinook during the
species' spawning, egg incubation, and rearing periods. These deliveries, and the SRS
Contractors' diversions, led to the near-total loss of an entire generation of winter-run and spring-
run Chinook that hatched, or would have hatched, in the Sacramento River below Shasta Dam in
the 2014 "brood year." This location is the last remaining spawning and rearing habitat for wild
winter-run Chinook in the Central Valley, and Reclamation's actions caused devastating losses to
this species, as well as the spring-run Chinook, which relies on similar areas for critical habitat.
In 2015, in spite of Reclamation's assurances that it would not repeat the same catastrophic
mistakes, Reclamation again made excessive deliveries to satisfy the SRS contracts that led to
fatal temperature increases below Shasta Dam. Early data suggests that the impacts to the 2015
brood year are even worse than in 2014, and that loss of a second consecutive generation of the
species is likely. Salmonids generally live three years, spawning just once, so the loss of a third
generation in 2016 could tip the species over the brink of extinction in the wild. Because neither
Reclamation nor the SRS Contractors have authorization to take winter-run or spring-run
Chinook, Plaintiffs seek to add a claim for violation of Section 9 of the ESA.

The proposed claims are inextricably intertwined with the existing claims in this litigation. It would make no sense to resolve only a subset of the issues regarding the renewed SRS contracts and Reclamation's obligations under the ESA. The most efficient path to a complete disposition of the dispute over the contracts is to allow Plaintiffs to file their proposed 4SC.

BACKGROUND

I. Status of the Litigation

Plaintiffs originally filed this lawsuit to challenge Reclamation's deficient consultation with FWS on the Long-Term Central Valley Project "Operations Criteria and Plan" ("OCAP"), which guides the coordinated operation of the Central Valley Project ("CVP") and State Water Project ("SWP"). *NRDC v. Kempthorne*, No. 1:05-1207, 2008 WL 5054115 ("*Kempthorne*"), at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2008) (Doc. 761). Reclamation intended that the OCAP would inform Reclamation's renewals of CVP water contracts that were expiring, including the 40-year renewals

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of the SRS contracts at issue. Id. at *5.

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FWS issued a biological opinion on the impacts of the OCAP on the delta smelt on July 30, 2004 ("FWS 2004 BiOp"), and then issued a revised biological opinion on February 16, 2005 ("FWS 2005 BiOp"), which superseded the FWS 2004 BiOp. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 333 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (Doc. 323). Both BiOps concluded that the OCAP would *not* cause jeopardy to the delta smelt nor adversely modify its critical habitat. *Id.* In 2005, FWS sent several "letters of concurrence," which relied exclusively upon the data and analysis in the FWS 2004 and 2005 BiOps, concluding that renewing the SRS contracts for 40 years on certain negotiated terms would not cause jeopardy to the delta smelt. SAR¹ 3340 (covering 138 contract renewals); SAR 1660-97 (Natomas Cent. Mut. Water Co.); SAR 289-331 (City of Redding); SAR 1-44 (Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist.).

Plaintiffs challenged the FWS 2005 BiOp and actions taken in reliance upon it, including the renewal of the SRS contracts. Pls.' First Supp. Compl. (May 20, 2005) (Doc. 40-1). In 2007, this Court² invalidated the FWS 2005 BiOp on numerous grounds and ordered FWS to complete a new biological opinion. 506 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88; Kempthorne, No. 1:05-1207, 2007 WL 4462391, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) (Doc. 560). The Court determined, however, that it could not grant Plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief as to the long-term contract renewals because some contractors were not parties to the lawsuit. Kempthorne, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (Doc. 567). The Court directed Plaintiffs to file the currently operative Third Supplemental Complaint, which joined the parties to thirty-three additional high volume contracts as defendants. *Id.* at 1191-92; Doc. 575.

Plaintiffs subsequently moved for summary judgment on their claim that Reclamation violated Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA by executing the contract renewals based on FWS's invalid consultation. Docs. 680-81. On November 19, 2008, the Court held Plaintiffs had standing to challenge the SRS contracts. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 5054115, at *40. Although the Court

Cites to "SAR" refer to the supplemental administrative record, lodged with the Court on June 6, 2008. Doc. 657.

² During earlier district court proceedings in this case, Judge Oliver W. Wanger issued numerous rulings, many of which are referenced throughout this brief as rulings of the "Court." After Judge Wanger's retirement in September 2011, the case was reassigned to Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill.

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eventually held (in a ruling that was reversed by the Ninth Circuit) that threshold issues precluded
a ruling on Plaintiffs' claims, it found that Reclamation's consultations on the SRS contracts
violated the ESA because FWS had relied exclusively on the "legally flawed OCAP BiOp which
failed to competently and completely evaluate the impacts of water deliveries under the [SRS]
Contracts on the Delta smelt." Id. The Court also found that Reclamation's reliance on the OCAF
BiOp was arbitrary and capricious given the numerous "serious" and "obvious" flaws in the
document. Id. at *32. Nonetheless, the Court held that the ESA's consultation requirement did
not apply to Reclamation's renewal of the SRS contracts because the original contracts left
Reclamation without sufficient discretion to negotiate new terms that would benefit the delta
smelt. Kempthorne, 621 F. Supp. 2d 954, 1000-01 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (Doc. 834).

After a divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, *NRDC v. Salazar*, 686 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2012), a unanimous en banc panel reversed. *NRDC v. Jewell*, 749 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The panel rejected the conclusion that Reclamation lacks discretion to renegotiate terms more protective of the delta smelt. *Id.* at 784-85. The panel explained that there is "nothing in the original Settlement contracts [that] requires the Bureau to renew the Settlement contracts" and, because "'Delta water diversions' are the most significant 'synergistic cause[]' of the decline in delta smelt," a decision not to renew the SRS contracts could benefit the delta smelt. *Id.* (quoting 58 Fed. Reg. 12854-01, 12,859 (Mar. 5, 1993)). Although the en banc panel held that the original contracts do not require renewal, it declined to decide "whether other legal obligations may compel [Reclamation] to execute renewal contracts." *Id.* at 785 n.1. Instead, the panel explained that, even were Reclamation obligated to renew the SRS contracts, Reclamation retained discretion that required ESA consultation because "[Reclamation] could benefit the delta smelt by renegotiating the Settlement contracts' terms with regard to, *inter alia*, their pricing scheme or the timing of water distribution." *Id.* at 785. The en banc panel remanded to this Court for "further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion." *Id.*

On remand, the Defendants moved to stay the litigation to allow Reclamation to reinitiate consultation under 50 C.F.R. §402.16. Doc. 955, 962. The Court granted the motion and stayed

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the case until December 15, 2015. Doc. 979 at 21.³

Subsequent to the Court's stay decision, Plaintiffs learned that Reclamation had requested reinitiation with FWS on the impacts of the SRS contract renewals to delta smelt, but not with NMFS on the impacts to winter-run and spring-run Chinook. Decl. of Katherine S. Poole ("Poole Decl.") ¶7. Plaintiffs requested that Reclamation expand its reinitiated consultation to include both agencies. *Id.* As of this filing, it appears that Reclamation is engaged in a reinitiated consultation with FWS, but has refused to reinitiate consultation with NMFS. *Id.* ¶8.

In the biological assessment ("BA") Reclamation submitted to FWS together with its request for reinitiation, Reclamation effectively denies that it has any discretion whatsoever to modify the contracts to benefit the delta smelt or its critical habitat. *Id.* Ex. 2B at 10-11 (Supplemental Information to the Sacramento River Settlement Contractors Biological Assessment (July 2015)). This position directly contravenes the Ninth Circuit en banc panel's holding. For example, in spite of the en banc panel's ruling that Reclamation has discretion to alter the "timing of water distribution" to the SRS Contractors, *Jewell*, 749 F.3d at 785, Reclamation claims in the BA that it does not have discretion to "alter the . . . timing of SRS diversions from those set forth in the initial SRS contracts." Poole Decl. Ex. 2B at 10. And, in spite of the en banc panel's ruling that Reclamation has discretion to change the "pricing scheme" in the contracts to benefit the delta smelt, Reclamation claims in the BA that it "lacks discretion to set pricing terms in the SRS contracts for the sole purpose of protecting delta smelt." *Id.* at 11.

On October 20, 2015, NRDC sent a letter alerting FWS that Reclamation's assertions regarding discretion contradicted the en banc panel's ruling. Poole Decl. ¶5 & Ex. 4. NRDC also explained other deficiencies in the reinitiation package that Reclamation had submitted to FWS. *Id.* On October 28, 2015, NRDC alerted FWS of new environmental documents issued by Reclamation on October 26, 2015, demonstrating Reclamation's exercise of the very discretion that it denied it had in the BA: to modify the timing of deliveries under the SRS contracts. *Id.* ¶6 & Ex. 5. Specifically, Reclamation authorized the modification of terms related to timing in the

³ All pincites to docket entries use CM/ECF pagination, not the documents' internal pagination.

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SRS contracts to allow for the extended use of diverted water. *Id.* Ex. 5. Neither Reclamation nor FWS has responded to Plaintiffs' input.

II. Plaintiffs' Proposed Fourth Supplemental Complaint

Plaintiffs propose to supplement the operative complaint with two new claims that are inextricably intertwined with the factual and legal questions already at issue in this case. First, the 4SC challenges Reclamation's failure to reinitiate consultation under Section 7 of the ESA with NMFS on the impacts of the SRS contract renewals to listed winter-run and spring-run Chinook. Second, the 4SC alleges that Reclamation and the defendant SRS Contractors violated Section 9 of the ESA by implementing the renewed contracts in a manner that caused unlawful and unauthorized take of listed Chinook.⁴

A. Plaintiffs' Section 7(a)(2) Claim Against Reclamation for Failure to Reinitiate Consultation in Violation of the ESA's Implementing Regulations

Plaintiffs' proposed 4SC alleges that Reclamation violated Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA and the ESA's implementing regulations, 50 C.F.R. §402.16, by failing to reinitiate consultation on the impacts of the SRS contract renewals on listed winter-run and spring-run Chinook. 4SC ¶¶145-50. The ESA's implementing regulations require an action agency, such as Reclamation, to reinitiate Section 7(a)(2) consultation if the agency has "discretionary Federal involvement or control over the action" at issue, and a triggering event occurs, including "[i]f new information reveals effects of the action that may affect listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to an extent not previously considered." 50 C.F.R. §402.16(b). The 4SC alleges that Reclamation is obligated to reinitiate consultation, that Reclamation has "new information" indicating that the listed Chinook and their critical habitat may be affected by the SRS contract renewals "in a manner or to an extent not previously considered," and that Reclamation has failed to reinitiate consultation. 4SC ¶¶116-21, 145-50.

⁴ The two additional proposed claims in the 4SC are brought by existing Plaintiffs NRDC, The Bay Institute ("TBI"), and San Francisco Baykeeper ("Baykeeper"), as well as proposed Plaintiffs, the Winnemem Wintu Tribe ("Winnemem") and Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations/Institute for Fisheries Resources ("PCFFA"). The 4SC does not join Winnemem and PCFFA in the existing claims pertaining to delta smelt.

1. The jeopardy finding in the 2009 NMFS OCAP BiOp and later amendments is "new information" requiring Reclamation to reinitiate consultation on the renewed SRS contracts

The 4SC alleges that Reclamation violated the ESA and its implementing regulations, 50 C.F.R. §402.16, when it failed to reinitiate consultation with NMFS on the effects of the renewed SRS contracts after NMFS replaced a no-jeopardy biological opinion, upon which the initial consultation on the renewed SRS contracts relied, with a jeopardy biological opinion. 4SC ¶¶118, 145-48, 150.

In 2004, NMFS issued a biological opinion determining that the OCAP *would not* cause jeopardy to winter-run and spring-run Chinook and other anadromous species ("NMFS 2004 OCAP BiOp"). *PCFFA v. Gutierrez*, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1145-46 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Reclamation subsequently requested consultation with NMFS on the effects of renewing the SRS contracts on winter-run and spring-run Chinook. Poole Decl. Ex. 7 (Letter from Rodney McInnis, NOAA Fisheries, to Michael J. Ryan, Reclamation (Jan. 10, 2005)). Relying exclusively on the no-jeopardy finding of the NMFS 2004 OCAP BiOp, NMFS concluded that the SRS contract renewals would not cause jeopardy to the winter-run and spring-run Chinook. *Id.*; 4SC ¶86.

After a federal court invalidated the NMFS 2004 OCAP BiOp and its no-jeopardy finding, *Gutierrez*, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1194, NMFS issued a new biological opinion on June 4, 2009 ("NMFS OCAP BiOp"). LoPresti Decl. Ex. A. This new biological opinion, in contrast to the previous one, determined that the OCAP *would* cause jeopardy to winter-run and spring-run Chinook, and adversely modify their critical habitat. *Id.* The NMFS OCAP BiOp, however, expressly states that it does not analyze the impacts of Reclamation's water contracts and directs Reclamation to separately consult on those contracts. *Id.* at 35. The NMFS OCAP BiOp was subsequently amended in 2011, and again in 2014 and 2015.⁵

⁵ The NMFS OCAP BiOp was amended in 2011 to reflect the report of an independent review panel, LoPresti Decl. Ex. B (Letter from R. McInnis, Reclamation, to D. Glaser, Reclamation (Apr. 7, 2011)), and in 2014 and 2015 in response to Reclamation's Drought Operations Plan and Temporary Urgency Change Petitions that waived or modified requirements in the NMFS OCAP BiOp and water quality standards in the Bay-Delta. *Id.* Ex. C (Letter from W. Stelle, NMFS, to D. Murrillo, Reclamation (undated, but posted on Apr. 8, 2014), Ex. D (Letter from W. Stelle, NMFS, to D. Murillo, Reclamation and M. Cowin, DWR (Mar. 27, 2015)), Ex. E (Letter from W. Stelle, NMFS, to D. Murillo, Reclamation and M. Cowin, DWR (Jan. 31, 2014)).

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Even though Reclamation's consultation on the renewal of the SRS contracts relied exclusively on the NMFS 2004 OCAP BiOp, Reclamation did not reinitiate consultation after the NMFS 2004 OCAP BiOp was invalidated, nor after the NMFS OCAP BiOp was issued, nor after the NMFS OCAP BiOp was subsequently amended. 4SC ¶91. Plaintiffs' proposed 4SC thus claims that the NMFS OCAP BiOp and amendments constituted "new information" triggering Reclamation's mandatory duty to reinitiate consultation under 50 C.F.R. §402.16(b). 4SC ¶¶118, 145-48, 150.

2. Massive mortality of listed Chinook in 2014 and 2015 triggered Reclamation's duty to reinitiate consultation on the renewed SRS contracts

The proposed 4SC also alleges that Reclamation violated 50 C.F.R. §402.16 by failing to reinitiate consultation when Reclamation authorized diversions to the SRS Contractors that resulted in massive mortality to the 2014 and 2015 brood years of winter-run and spring-run Chinook. 4SC ¶119, 145-47, 149-50.

Winter-run Chinook inhabit the upper Sacramento River and its tributaries, where the flow of cold water throughout the summer allows for successful spawning, egg incubation, and rearing. LoPresti Decl. Ex. A at 79. Historically, winter-run Chinook relied on the McCloud, Pit, and Little Sacramento rivers, as well as Hat and Battle creeks, for habitat conducive to spawning, egg incubation, fry development, and juvenile rearing. *Id.* at 79-80. The construction of Shasta Dam blocked access to almost all of these waters. *Id.* Today, the upper Sacramento River below Keswick Dam is the sole remaining spawning and rearing area used by winter-run Chinook. *Id.* The survival of the winter-run Chinook is therefore completely dependent on Reclamation's management of the temperature and flow conditions below Keswick dam.

Winter-run Chinook are particularly vulnerable during the "temperature management season," which generally lasts from June through October. *Id.* at 79-81, 601. Adult winter-run Chinook migrate up the Sacramento River in the winter and spring and then hold below the Keswick Dam for several months before spawning. *Id.* During these critical months, the winter-run require cold water (between 41 and 56 degrees Fahrenheit) for spawning and development of fertilized eggs. *Id.* at 76-79. Warmer temperatures decrease egg viability and also contribute to

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higher mortality at later life stages. <i>Id.</i> at 77-81; <i>id.</i> Ex. F at 4 (Evaluation of Alternatives for
Sacramento River Water Temperature Compliance for Winter-Run Chinook Salmon (undated));
4SC ¶52. Accordingly, reasonable and prudent alternative ("RPA") 1.2.4 in the NMFS OCAP
BiOp requires that Reclamation preserve enough cold water in Shasta Reservoir so that it can
make timed releases throughout the hot summer and fall months of the temperature management
season to maintain daily average water temperatures at or below 56 degrees at compliance
locations between Balls Ferry and Bend Bridge from approximately May 15 through September
30.6 LoPresti Decl. Ex. A at 601-03.

In 2014, Reclamation made excessive releases for the purpose of meeting the terms of the SRS contracts, depleting the cold-water reserves in Shasta Reservoir. *Id.* Ex. O (daily Keswick release summaries for April-June 2014); 4SC ¶58. As a result, temperatures escalated to fatal levels for extended periods, resulting in near-total loss of the winter-run brood year and similar losses to spring-run Chinook. LoPresti Decl. Ex. J at 2 (Letter from M. Rea, NMFS, to R. Milligan, Reclamation (Feb. 27, 2015)); *id.* Ex. G at 11 (State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") Order approving temporary urgency change petition ("TUCP") (Feb. 3, 2015)); *id.* Ex. R at 15-16 (SWRCB Order approving TUCP (July 3, 2015)); 4SC ¶58. Even though Reclamation lost temperature control by making excessive deliveries to the SRS Contractors, and caused massive mortality to listed salmonid species as a result, Reclamation did not reinitiate consultation on the SRS contracts. *Id.* ¶119.

In February 2015, in reviewing Reclamation's water supply allocation and related operations for 2015, NMFS stated that, "[i]n light of the high mortality (95%) associated with water temperatures observed in 2014 for juvenile winter-run Chinook salmon that spawned in upper Sacramento River, . . . [it is] important to conserve storage in Shasta Reservoir, and specifically the cold water pool, in order to provide for the needs of winter-run [Chinook] eggs and alevin throughout the temperature management season." LoPresti Decl. Ex. J at 2. In spite of NMFS's clear warning, Reclamation again made excessive releases from Shasta Reservoir in

⁶ Although spring-run migration patterns are different than for winter-run, both species rely on cold-water for spawning, egg incubation, and rearing. LoPresti Decl. Ex. A at 77.

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2015 to satisfy the terms of the SRS contracts. <i>Id.</i> Ex. P (daily Keswick release summaries for
April-June 2015); id. Ex. I at 4, 9; 4SC ¶60. In fact, Reclamation increased Keswick releases
from a total 604,083 acre feet in April and May of 2014, to a total 677,730 acre feet in April and
May of 2015. Compare LoPresti Decl. Ex. O with id. Ex. P. After making these releases, and in
spite of prior assurances to the contrary, Reclamation announced that it could not maintain water
temperatures of 56 degrees at the Clear Creek compliance point during the temperature
management season. Id. Ex. K at 2-3 (SWRCB Notice of Public Workshop (June 13, 2015)); Ex.
Q at Slide 5-6 (SWRCB presentation at Public Workshop (June 24, 2015)). Indeed, the daily
average water temperature at the compliance point has been above 56 degrees almost every single
day of the temperature management season. <i>Id.</i> Ex. L (Sacramento River temperature reports
showing temperatures at Clear Creek above 56 degrees for 29 days in June, 30 days in July, 28
days in August, and 28 days in September). Reclamation's releases again depleted the cold water
pool and severely compromised the spawning and rearing habitat for the annual brood of winter-
run Chinook in 2015. <i>Id.</i> Ex. I at 4, 9; 4SC ¶¶60-62.

In June 2015, NMFS's analysis indicated that Reclamation's April and May deliveries to the SRS contractors would cause a second consecutive year of disastrous impacts to winter-run Chinook. LoPresti Decl. Ex. I. NMFS explained that "the quantity and quality of the cold water pool[] will not provide for suitable winter-run [Chinook] habitat needs throughout their egg and alevin incubation and fry rearing periods" and that these harmful conditions "could have been largely prevented through upgrades in monitoring and modeling, and reduced Keswick releases in April and May." Id. at 9 (emphasis added). As of October 22, 2015, preliminary data on winter run passage at Red Bluff Diversion Dam—an early indicator of brood year survival—was 22% lower for the 2015 winter-run brood year than for the 2014 winter-run brood year. Id. Ex. M (FWS Bi-Weekly Report (Oct. 22, 2015)). In spite of the data and analysis showing that Reclamation's operations to benefit the SRS Contractors are causing even worse levels of catastrophic mortality to winter-run Chinook this year than in 2014, Reclamation still has not reinitiated consultation on the SRS contracts. 4SC ¶119.

Plaintiffs' proposed 4SC alleges that Reclamation violated 50 C.F.R. §402.16 by

repeatedly failing to reinitiate consultation in light of the excessive levels of take of winter-run Chinook associated with Reclamation's implementation of the SRS contracts in 2014 and 2015. *Id.* ¶¶119, 145-50.

B. Plaintiffs' Section 9 Claim Against Reclamation and the SRS Contractors for Unauthorized Take of Winter-Run and Spring-Run Chinook

Plaintiffs also allege in the proposed 4SC that, because neither Reclamation nor the SRS Contractors have authorization to take winter-run and spring-run Chinook to satisfy the terms of the SRS contracts, Reclamation's excessive releases to the SRS Contractors, and the SRS Contractors' diversions, violated ESA section 9. *Id.* ¶122-31, 151-55; 16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1)(B).

Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the "take" of any endangered or threatened species of fish or wildlife. 16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1)(B). The statute prohibits any person from directly taking any protected species and makes it unlawful to "cause to be committed" any take. *Id.* §1538(g). Congress defined take broadly to mean "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." *Id.* §1532(19). The ESA's implementing regulations further define "harass" to mean "an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavior patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering," and "harm" to include "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. §17.3. The Supreme Court has explained that "Congress intended 'take' to apply broadly to cover indirect as well as purposeful actions." *Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.*, 515 U.S. 687, 704 (1995). For instance, "harming a species may be indirect, in that the harm may be caused by habitat modification." *Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal*, 204 F.3d 920, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1999).

Pursuant to Section 7(b)(4) of the ESA, a consulting agency may issue an "incidental take statement" if the agency concludes both that the federal action in question will not jeopardize a listed species, or can be carried out pursuant to an RPA without jeopardizing a species, and that the taking of the species is incidental to the action and will not cause jeopardy. 16 U.S.C.

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§1536(b)(4)(A)-(B). "If the terms and conditions of the Incidental Take Statement are
disregarded and a taking does occur, the action agency or the applicant may be subject to
potentially severe civil and criminal penalties under Section 9." Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1239 (9th Cir. 2001).

The proposed 4SC alleges that Reclamation's deliveries, and the SRS Contractors' diversions, depleted the cold water in Shasta Reservoir that was critical to the spawning, egg incubation, and rearing of the winter-run and spring-run broods in 2014 and 2015. 4SC ¶¶58-62. The resultant loss in temperature control and massive mortality constitutes "take" within the meaning of Section 9 of the ESA. 16 U.S.C. §1532(19); 50 C.F.R. §17.3. These deliveries and diversions caused "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. §17.3; 4SC ¶¶58-62, 127.

Neither the NMFS OCAP BiOp, nor NMFS's 2005 concurrence letter on the SRS contracts, nor any other consultation, provides authorization to take listed Chinook for the purpose of making deliveries to the SRS Contractors. 4SC ¶128-31. The NMFS OCAP BiOp's incidental take statement does not provide authority for incidental take caused by water deliveries to the SRS Contractors, which the biological opinion characterizes as "nondiscretionary." LoPresti Decl. Ex. A at 35, 673, 729 ("any incidental take due to delivery of water to . . . a contractor" that Reclamation identifies as "nondiscretionary" is not exempted from the BiOp's Section 9 take prohibition). Similarly, NMFS's 2005 concurrence letter on the SRS contracts,

⁷ Even were Reclamation now to contend that quantities of deliveries to the SRS Contractors were considered at the time of the NMFS OCAP BiOp to be "discretionary," Reclamation and the SRS Contractors have failed to comply with the protective measures required by NMFS to minimize or avoid take. For example, in 2014, Reclamation reinitiated consultation with NMFS on the 2009 BiOp to assess the impacts of the joint Drought Operations Plan it submitted with DWR for the operation of the CVP and SWP between April 1, 2014 and November 15, 2014. LoPresti Decl. Ex. C (letter from W. Stelle, NMFS, to D. Murillo, Reclamation (undated, posted on Apr. 8, 2011). NMFS's approval of the Drought Operations Plan was contingent on conserving storage of cold water in Shasta Reservoir so that Reclamation could control temperatures throughout the season. Specifically, NMFS required that Reclamation "limit[] releases from Keswick Dam to no greater than 3,250 cfs... unless necessary to meet nondiscretionary obligations or legal requirements." *Id.* at 4. Reclamation, however, made releases from Keswick Dam between April and early June 2014 far in excess of 3,250 cubic feet per second ("cfs") that depleted the cold water pool behind Shasta Dam and led to the loss of temperature control. *Id.* Ex. O.

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which relied exclusively on the now-superseded NMFS 2004 OCAP BiOp, did not provide authorization for take. Poole Decl. Ex. 7 ("No additional take is authorized for these contract specific actions beyond the amount or extent of incidental take authorized in the October 22, 2004 BiOp."). Because NMFS has not provided authorization in the NMFS OCAP BiOp or elsewhere for the take of winter-run and spring-run Chinook caused by Reclamation's water deliveries to the SRS Contractors, Plaintiffs' proposed 4SC alleges that Reclamation and the SRS Contractors have violated, and are violating, Section 9 of the ESA by implementing terms of the SRS contracts that are causing massive mortality to the species and destroying their critical habitat.⁸ 4SC ¶122-31, 151-55.

ARGUMENT

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 15(d) provides that, "On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented." Plaintiffs seek to supplement their complaint to add claims based on events that occurred after the filing of their Third Supplemental Complaint.

I. Legal Standard

The purpose of allowing supplementation "is to promote as complete an adjudication of the dispute between the parties as possible by allowing the addition of claims which arise after the initial pleadings are filed." *William Inglis & Sons Baking Co.*, 668 F.2d at 1057. Rule 15(d) implements "one of the basic policies of the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] . . . that a party should be given every opportunity to join in one lawsuit all grievances against another party regardless of when they arose." Wright & Miller, 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. §1506 (3d ed.). "The courts have generally granted motions to supplement under [Rule] 15(d) where a matter is still

⁸ On August 10, 2015, pursuant to the notice requirements of Section 11(g) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. §1540(g), Plaintiffs NRDC, Baykeeper, and TBI, and proposed Plaintiffs Winnemem and PCFFA, sent a sixty-day notice of intent to sue Reclamation and the SRS Contractors that are parties to this case for the above-described violations. 4SC Ex. 6.

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pending, and final judgment has not yet been entered."	W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest
Serv., CV-05-189, 2009 WL 3151121, at *2 (D. Idaho 2	2009) (collecting cases).

convenience." <i>Lyon v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement</i> , 308 F.R.D. 203, 214 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Thus, courts consider whether supplementation would allow for disposition of the "entire controversy between the parties in one action." <i>Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely</i> , 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997). "[T]he matters stated in a supplemental complaint should have some relation to the claim set forth in the original pleading," but they do not need to "arise out of the same transaction or occurrence nor involve common questions of law or fact." <i>Keith v. Volpe</i> , 858 F.2d 467, 474 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted). When a supplemental complaint "raises similar legal issues to those already before the court," leave to supplement is generally warranted to "avert[] a separate, redundant lawsuit." <i>Fund For Animals v. Hall</i> , 246 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2007). Relatedly, when a court has developed familiarity with the statutes, regulations, legal theories, scientific considerations, and facts of a case, supplementation to add like claims is favored as a means to judicial economy. <i>Ohio Valley Envil. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng's</i> , 243 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D. W.Va. 2007); <i>San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior</i> , 236 F.R.D. 491, 499 (E.D. Cal. 2006)	Supplementation is "generally favored because it promotes judicial economy and
"entire controversy between the parties in one action." <i>Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely</i> , 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997). "[T]he matters stated in a supplemental complaint should have some relation to the claim set forth in the original pleading," but they do not need to "arise out of the same transaction or occurrence nor involve common questions of law or fact." <i>Keith v. Volpe</i> , 858 F.2d 467, 474 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted). When a supplemental complaint "raises similar legal issues to those already before the court," leave to supplement is generally warranted to "avert[] a separate, redundant lawsuit." <i>Fund For Animals v. Hall</i> , 246 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2007). Relatedly, when a court has developed familiarity with the statutes, regulations, legal theories, scientific considerations, and facts of a case, supplementation to add like claims is favored as a means to judicial economy. <i>Ohio Valley Envil. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng's</i> , 243 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D. W.Va. 2007); <i>San Luis & Delta-</i>	convenience." Lyon v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 308 F.R.D. 203, 214 (N.D.
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"arise out of the same transaction or occurrence nor involve common questions of law or fact." <i>Keith v. Volpe</i> , 858 F.2d 467, 474 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted). When a supplemental complaint "raises similar legal issues to those already before the court," leave to supplement is generally warranted to "avert[] a separate, redundant lawsuit." <i>Fund For Animals v. Hall</i> , 246 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2007). Relatedly, when a court has developed familiarity with the statutes, regulations, legal theories, scientific considerations, and facts of a case, supplementation to add like claims is favored as a means to judicial economy. <i>Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng's</i> , 243 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D. W.Va. 2007); <i>San Luis & Delta-</i>	Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997). "[T]he matters stated in a supplemental complaint
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the statutes, regulations, legal theories, scientific considerations, and facts of a case, supplementation to add like claims is favored as a means to judicial economy. <i>Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng's</i> , 243 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D. W.Va. 2007); <i>San Luis & Delta-</i>	supplement is generally warranted to "avert[] a separate, redundant lawsuit." Fund For Animals
supplementation to add like claims is favored as a means to judicial economy. <i>Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng's</i> , 243 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D. W.Va. 2007); <i>San Luis & Delta-</i>	v. Hall, 246 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2007). Relatedly, when a court has developed familiarity with
Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng's, 243 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D. W.Va. 2007); San Luis & Delta-	the statutes, regulations, legal theories, scientific considerations, and facts of a case,
	supplementation to add like claims is favored as a means to judicial economy. Ohio Valley Envtl.
Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 236 F.R.D. 491, 499 (E.D. Cal. 2006)	Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng's, 243 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D. W.Va. 2007); San Luis & Delta-
	Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 236 F.R.D. 491, 499 (E.D. Cal. 2006)
("SLDMWA").	("SLDMWA").

In addition to considerations of judicial economy, courts apply the same legal standard for granting or denying a motion to supplement under Rule 15(d) as they do for amending under Rule 15(a)(2). *Lyon*, 308 F.R.D. at 214. Rule 15(a)(2) provides that a "court should freely give leave when justice so requires." This policy is to be applied with "extreme liberality," *Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.*, 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001), and the "liberality . . . is not dependent on whether the amendment will add causes of action or parties," *DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton*, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987).

Given this generous rule, "there exists a *presumption* under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend," *Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.*, 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original), and all inferences should generally be drawn in favor of amendment,

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<i>Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc.</i> , 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). The burden is on the
opposing party to show that amendment is inappropriate. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187.
Courts will consider whether: (1) the plaintiff unjustly delayed in seeking leave to amend; (2) the
plaintiff seeks leave to amend in bad faith; (3) whether leave to amend would cause undue
prejudice; (4) whether amendment would be futile; and (5) whether there has been repeated
failure of previous amendments. Lyon, 308 F.R.D. at 214 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182-83 S.Ct. 227 (1962)). Among these factors, prejudice to the opposing party carries the
greatest weight. Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

II. Leave to File the Proposed 4SC Should Be Granted Because It Will Promote Judicial Economy and None of the Factors Precluding Leave Are Present

A. Leave to File the Proposed 4SC Will Promote Judicial Economy

Supplementation would promote judicial economy because it would facilitate a complete adjudication of the entire controversy regarding the SRS contract renewals. It would waste judicial resources to resolve claims regarding consultation on the effects of the SRS contract renewals on delta smelt without addressing the interconnected effects of these same contracts on listed salmonid species. Further, Reclamation's failure to reinitiate consultation with NMFS on the SRS contracts is closely tied to Defendants' illegal take of salmonid species over the last two years.

Plaintiffs' proposed claim against Reclamation for failure to reinitiate consultation on the impacts of the SRS contract renewals on listed salmonid species would promote judicial economy because the claim "raise[s] legal issues that are similar to those already before the court" and would therefore "avert[] a separate, redundant lawsuit." *Fund For Animals*, 246 F.R.D. at 55. Further, Plaintiffs' proposed claim involves issues that are "closely and directly related to the issues decided in earlier stages of this litigation." *SLDMWA*, 236 F.R.D. at 498.

In its June 15, 2015 order, the Court stayed this litigation to provide Reclamation an opportunity to reinitiate consultation with FWS on the SRS and other contract renewals. Doc.

not at issue.

PLS.' MEM. ISO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH SUPP. COMPLAINT CASE NO. 1:05-CV-01207 LJO-EPG

⁹ Because the events giving rise to the proposed 4SC arose after the filing of the Third Supplemental Complaint, the fifth factor addressing "repeated failure of previous amendments" is

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979 at 20-21. Reclamation argued, and the Court agreed, that the invalidation of FWS's no-
jeopardy 2005 OCAP BiOp, upon which the concurrence letters for the contract renewals
exclusively relied, and the subsequent release of FWS's 2008 OCAP BiOp, which found
jeopardy, warranted reinitiation of consultation on the renewal contracts under 50 C.F.R. §402.16.
Id. at 12, 16; Doc. 955 at 7, 12-13 (Fed. Defs.' Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Stay ("Fed.
Defs.' MTS Br.")); Doc. 970 at 14 (Fed. Defs.' Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Stay). Plaintiffs
continue to believe that the Court should assess whether a valid consultation was completed prior
to the execution of the contracts, rather than allowing the agencies to engage in post hoc
compliance with Section 7 by reinitiating consultation. See Jewell, 749 F.3d at 785. Nonetheless,
just as the Court found that reinitiation of consultation with FWS was warranted with respect to
the contracts' impacts on delta smelt, reinitiation of consultation with NMFS is also necessary.
Analogous to the FWS history of consultation, here, the invalidation of NMFS's no-jeopardy
2004 OCAP BiOp, upon which the concurrence letters for the SRS contract renewals exclusively
relied, and the subsequent release of the NMFS OCAP BiOp in 2009, which found jeopardy,
requires reinitiation of consultation with NMFS on the SRS contract renewals under 50 C.F.R.
§402.16. Given that the analysis is virtually identical, it would promote judicial economy to
address Plaintiffs' new reinitiation claim as part of the existing lawsuit, rather than requiring
separate litigation. See Fund For Animals, 246 F.R.D. at 55; Ohio Valley, 243 F.R.D. at 257.
Description with both EWC and NMEC would also may ide a more common accordance

Reinitiation with both FWS and NMFS would also provide a more comprehensive consultation that would address the sometimes-competing needs of delta smelt and listed salmonid species in administration of these contracts. For instance, flow requirements necessary to maintain Delta conditions suitable for the delta smelt have been repeatedly waived during the drought for the ostensible purpose of allowing Reclamation to increase upstream storage in Shasta Reservoir to protect spawning and rearing habitat for listed salmonids. Doc. 967 (Rosenfield Decl.) ¶9; LoPresti Decl. Ex. G (SWRCB Order Approving TUCP (Feb. 3, 2015)). The NMFS OCAP BiOp similarly recognizes that "meeting the biological needs of winter-run and the needs of resident species in the Delta, delivery of water to nondiscretionary Sacramento Settlement

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Contractors, and Delta outflow requirements per D-1641, may be in conflict," particularly
during extended periods of dry hydrology. LoPresti Decl. Ex. A at 600. The ESA Consultation
Handbook states that when there is overlap in the subject matter of FWS and NMFS
consultations, coordination "is critical to ensure any reasonable and prudent alternatives
prescribed by both the Services are compatible." ESA Consultation Handbook at 2-14 (Mar.
1998). 11 Indeed, after the 2008 FWS BiOp and the 2009 NMFS BiOp were issued, the
Secretaries of Commerce and Interior announced the importance of taking a coordinated,
interagency approach to consultation on Bay-Delta issues in the future. LoPresti Decl. Ex. N
(Letter from K. Salazar, Sec'y of the Interior, and G. Locke, Sec'y of Commerce, to N. Sutley,
Council on Envtl. Quality (May 3, 2010)). There is every reason to take that approach here.
Because the needs of delta smelt and listed salmonids interact, any action taken in response to one
consulting agency's reinitiated consultation will likely trigger reinitiation with the other agency.
It is therefore most efficient to conduct these consultations in tandem.

Additionally, the viability of a federal action, such as the SRS contract renewals, depends on Reclamation's compliance with ESA section 7 for *both* salmonids and delta smelt. 16 U.S.C. \$1536(a)(2). Even if the reinitiated consultation scheduled to occur with FWS on delta smelt passes legal muster, the SRS contract renewals are not ESA-compliant unless and until there has been adequate consultation with NMFS on the impacts to salmonid species as well. Thus, it serves judicial economy to resolve the "entire controversy" over the renewals in one case that addresses both salmonids and smelt, rather than prolonging final resolution by requiring litigation of a second action. *Neely*, 130 F.3d at 402; *see also* Wright & Miller, 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. \$1506 ("[T]he usual effect of denying leave to file a supplemental pleading because it states a new 'cause of action' is to force plaintiff to institute another action and move for consolidation under Rule 42(a) in order to litigate both claims in the same suit, a wasteful and inefficient result.").

¹⁰ SWRCB's Water Rights Decision 1641 ("D-1641") contains requirements that Reclamation operate the CVP to meet applicable water quality standards. SWRCB Water Rights Order 2000-02.

¹¹ The ESA Consultation Handbook is available online at the web address: https://www.fws.gov/ENDANGERED/esa-library/pdf/esa_section7_handbook.pdf>.

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Supplementation is also beneficial because resolution of Plaintiffs' proposed reinitiation-
of-consultation claim involves issues that are "closely and directly related to the issues decided in
earlier stages of this litigation." SLDMWA, 236 F.R.D. at 498. As explained supra, Background
section I, the Ninth Circuit's en banc panel reversed the district court's ruling that Reclamation
lacks discretion to make species-protective changes to the contracts' terms. Jewell, 749 F.3d at
785. Although the panel did not fully delineate the scope of Reclamation's discretion, it gave
specific examples of SRS contract provisions that Reclamation had discretion to change,
including "their pricing scheme or the timing of water distribution." Id. The BA that
Reclamation submitted to FWS contains numerous assertions regarding discretion that directly
contravene the en banc panel's ruling. Poole Decl. Ex. 2B at 10-11.
The Court's enforcement of the en hanc nanel's ruling regarding Reclamation's discretion

The Court's enforcement of the en banc panel's ruling regarding Reclamation's discretion will likely be key to the final resolution of Plaintiffs' existing and proposed claims.

Reclamation's misrepresentation of its discretion may taint FWS's consultation on the contract renewals by impermissibly limiting FWS's analysis, conclusions, and any RPA it might put in place. If Reclamation is required to reinitiate consultation with NMFS on the renewed SRS contracts, the same or similar issues will be presented. The Court's application and enforcement of the en banc panel's order with respect to the current reinitiated consultation with FWS will likely also apply to the scope of any reinitiated consultation with NMFS. It is most efficient to address this issue one time in this litigation, rather than require additional duplicative litigation.

The addition of Plaintiffs' Section 9 claim would serve judicial economy because it is related to Plaintiffs' existing and proposed Section 7 claims and would "promote as complete an adjudication of the dispute between the parties as possible." *William Inglis*, 668 F.2d at 1057. Reclamation's loss of temperature control occurred in 2014 and 2015, largely if not entirely, because Reclamation made excessive releases to satisfy the terms of the SRS contract renewals that are the subject of Plaintiffs' existing claims. Even though the NMFS OCAP BiOp makes explicit that it "does not address ESA section 7(a)(2) compliance for individual water supply contracts," and that "Reclamation . . . should consult with NMFS separately on their issuance of individual water supply contracts," LoPresti Decl. Ex. A at 35, Reclamation never reinitiated

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consultation with NMFS. If Reclamation had reinitiated consultation on the SRS contract renewals prior to 2014, or after the near-total loss of the 2014 brood year, NMFS could have taken steps to prevent the devastating impacts that have occurred and are occurring.

In sum, Plaintiffs' proposed Section 7 and Section 9 claims "raise[] similar legal issues to those already before the court," and granting Plaintiffs' motion would avert the need for a "separate, redundant lawsuit." *Fund For Animals*, 246 F.R.D. at 55. Supplementation would "promote judicial economy and convenience," *Lyon*, 308 F.R.D. at 214, by allowing for a comprehensive resolution of the "entire controversy" over the SRS contracts, *Neely*, 130 F.3d at 402.

B. Leave Should Be Granted Because None of the Factors That Would Weigh Against Supplementation Is Present

1. There is no unjust delay or bad faith

Plaintiffs have not unjustly delayed seeking to supplement their complaint and have not acted in bad faith. This Court's June 15, 2015 stay order, and Reclamation's recent actions, have created a need for claims addressing listed salmonid species.

Plaintiffs have not previously alleged that Reclamation failed to reinitiate consultation on the SRS contracts because Plaintiffs' position has been (and continues to be) that Reclamation improperly consulted on the original execution of the contract renewals. *See, e.g.*, Doc. 965 (Pls.' Opp. to Mtn. to Stay Proceedings) at 20-22. Plaintiffs have long argued that the contract renewals should be set aside and renegotiated to include appropriate species-protective terms. *Id.* at 36. Before any such renegotiated contract could go into effect, Reclamation would be required to consult with both FWS on impacts to delta smelt and with NMFS on impacts to listed salmonids. 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2).

Rather than address the validity of Reclamation's consultation on the original contract renewals, the Court has allowed Reclamation to reinitiate consultation while leaving the existing contract renewals in place. Doc. 979. Although Plaintiffs do not agree that Reclamation should be permitted to engage in post-hoc compliance with the ESA, they contend that any reinitiated consultation on the contract renewals must involve both FWS and NMFS to assess the

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interrelated impacts on delta smelt and listed salmonids. Indeed, the SRS Contractors also
envisioned, in the wake of the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion, that Reclamation would reinitiate
consultation with both FWS and NMFS, asserting as much to the Supreme Court. See Glenn-
Colusa Irrigation Dist. v. NRDC, Reply Br. 5, Case No. 14-48 (Oct. 29, 2014) ("Remand in this
instance entails a full Section 7(a)(2) consultation with the two federal resource agencies: the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for delta smelt, and the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) for salmonid species."). In light of Reclamation's refusal to reinitiate
consultation with NMFS, Plaintiffs now seek to file the proposed 4SC to ensure that the
reinitiated consultation properly assesses impacts to listed salmonids. 4SC ¶¶145-48, 150.

In addition to recent developments in this litigation, Plaintiffs seek leave to file the 4SC now because of Reclamation's recent and repeated failures to maintain temperature control in the Sacramento River in order to satisfy the SRS contracts. As described *supra*, Background section II.A.2, after Reclamation's excessive deliveries and loss of temperature control caused massive mortality to winter-run and spring-run Chinook in 2014, Reclamation represented that it would avoid a similar result in 2015. It has utterly failed to do so. The loss of a third consecutive generation in 2016 would be devastating to the survival and recovery of winter-run and spring-run Chinook, which generally live only three years. Plaintiffs seek to avoid a catastrophic third year of mortality by challenging both Reclamation's and the SRS Contractors' illegal take in violation of Section 9 and Reclamation's failure to reinitiate consultation with NMFS on the SRS contracts. 4SC ¶145-47, 149-50.

Prior to the recent developments in this litigation and in Reclamation's management of the CVP, there was simply no need to expand this litigation beyond the delta smelt. Plaintiffs have not unjustly delayed in seeking to supplement their complaint; rather, Plaintiffs are responding in real time to the changing circumstances of the litigation and Reclamation's decision-making.

2. Filing the 4SC would not cause undue prejudice to Defendants

Plaintiffs' proposed supplemental complaint will not cause undue prejudice to Defendants. "While prejudice to the non-movant is a valid reason for denying leave to amend, such prejudice must in fact be 'undue.'" *Dove v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.*, 221 F.R.D. 246, 248 (D.D.C.

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2004); see also Abels v. JBC Legal Grp., P.C., 229 F.R.D. 152, 157 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("To deny leave to amend, the prejudice must be substantial."). "Undue prejudice is not mere harm to the non-movant but a denial of the opportunity to present facts or evidence which would have been offered had the amendment been timely." Dove, 221 F.R.D. at 248. The Court will not, by granting leave to file the 4SC, deny Defendants an opportunity to present evidence or facts that would have been available had the proposed new claims been filed earlier.

Courts have sometimes found undue prejudice when a motion to amend or supplement is filed in the advanced stages of litigation. *See, e.g., Jacobson v. Rose*, 592 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1978). Although eight years have passed since the filing of the Third Supplemental Complaint, most of the litigation to date has centered on jurisdictional and procedural issues. When Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment in 2008, this Court's predecessor ruled that Plaintiffs lacked standing (as to claims involving some long-term contracts) and that Reclamation did not have sufficient discretion to trigger its obligations under the ESA as to the SRS contracts. Doc. 761 & 834. Those rulings were not corrected until the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion was filed in April 2014, *Jewell*, 749 F.3d 776, and the mandate was issued in November 2014, *NRDC v. Salazar*, 09-17661 (Nov. 5, 2014) (App. Doc. No. 242). After the parties unsuccessfully attempted to settle, *see* Doc. 944, Plaintiffs requested that the Court set a briefing schedule for motions for summary judgment, Doc. 947 at 4-7. The Court instead stayed the litigation to allow Reclamation to reinitiate consultation. Doc. 979.

In some cases, supplementation may cause undue prejudice if it "substantially changes the theory on which the case has been proceeding and is proposed late enough so that the opponent would be required to engage in significant new preparation." Wright & Miller, 6 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §1487 (3d ed.). That is not the case here. Plaintiffs' proposed Section 7 claim asks the Court to apply the same reasoning regarding reinitiation of consultation as the one the Federal Defendants argued, and the Court agreed to, when staying the litigation. Although the 4SC introduces a Section 9 claim to the litigation, it is closely related to the Section 7 claims. *See supra* at Background sections II.A.2-II.B. The facts that form the core of Defendants' Section 7 arguments are also key to the proposed Section 9 claim. Thus, no defendant will be burdened by

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extensive new legal or factual research. Indeed, when the "facts concerning [supplemental claims] are within defendants' knowledge," as they are here, there is "little prejudice to defendants by the addition of th[e] claim." *Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm*, 834 F. Supp. 1410, 1413 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); *see also LaSalvia v. United Dairymen of Ariz.*, 804 F.2d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing district court's denial of Plaintiff's motion to supplement complaint because "most of the information on the added claim would be available in [Defendant's] own files.").

There is no undue prejudice that would prevent the Court from granting Plaintiffs' motion to file the 4SC.

3. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the new claims asserted in the 4SC and filing the 4SC would not be futile

Futility of amendment is among the factors a court considers in determining whether to allow supplementation of a complaint. *Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc.*, 170 F.3d 877, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, "[c]ourts rarely deny a motion for leave to amend for reason of futility." *Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Toshiba Corp.*, No. C-04-4708, 2006 WL 3093812, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2006); *see also* William W. Schwarzer, et al., *Cal. Practice Guide: Fed. Civ. Proc. Before Trial* §8:1515 (2012) (noting that denials based on futility are "rare"). "[The] proper test to be applied when determining the legal sufficiency of a proposed amendment is identical to the one used when considering the sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Rule 12(b)(6)." *Asarco LLC v. Shore Terminals LLC*, No. C 11-01384, 2012 WL 440519, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2012) (quoting *Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.*, 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 580 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 663.

a. Plaintiffs' failure-to-reinitiate claim

As outlined supra, Background section II.A.1-2, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their

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proposed claim that Reclamation violated Section 7(a)(2) and the ESA's implementing
regulations, 50 C.F.R. §402.16, when it failed to reinitiate consultation with NMFS on the effects
of the SRS contract renewals to winter-run and spring-run Chinook. 4SC ¶145-50. A federal
agency must reinitiate consultation when it retains "Federal involvement or control over the
action," and one of several triggering events occurs including that "new information reveals
effects of the action that may affect listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to an extent not
previously considered," or "the identified action is subsequently modified in a manner that causes
an effect to the listed species or critical habitat that was not considered in the biological opinion."
50 C.F.R. §402.16(b)-(c).

There can be no dispute that Reclamation retains the requisite "discretionary federal involvement or control" over the contracts to trigger reinitiation. *Id.* §402.16. The *Jewell* en banc panel in this litigation unanimously ruled that Reclamation retains discretion to take species-protective measures with regards to the SRS contract renewals. *Jewell*, 749 F.3d at 784-85. Further, this Court has granted Reclamation's motion to stay proceedings to allow it to reinitiate consultation pursuant to 50 C.F.R. §402.16 to evaluate the impacts of the SRS renewals on the delta smelt, something the Court could not have done if Reclamation did not have the requisite discretion under that regulation. Doc. 979. Finally, in spite of Reclamation's assertions in the BA that it submitted to FWS that it does not have discretion to change the timing of its deliveries to the SRS Contractors, it has repeatedly done so. 4SC ¶120. In fact, as recently as October 26, 2015, Reclamation authorized temporary changes to the timing of deliveries to the SRS Contractors from the terms prescribed in the SRS contracts. Poole Decl. Ex. 5 at 1; *see also* LoPresti Decl. Ex. C at 2-3.

Reclamation also has extensive "Federal involvement" in the contract renewals' implementation. 4SC ¶121. Under the terms of the SRS contracts, Reclamation is not a passive participant, simply operating around diversions made by the SRS Contractors. Instead, the contract terms create an obligation for Reclamation to deliver specified quantities of water to the Contractors' various diversion facilities throughout the year. *See, e.g.*, SAR 2695-2737 (Contract Between the United States and Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., No. 14-060200-855A-R-1 (Feb. 28,

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2005)). Further, the contracts themselves require that Reclamation implement them in compliance with the ESA. *Id*.

The proposed 4SC describes events that clearly triggered Reclamation's mandatory duty to reinitiate consultation with NMFS. 4SC ¶¶58-62, 85-91, 118-19. First, when NMFS issued its 2009 BiOp and subsequent amendments, which found that the OCAP would jeopardize listed salmonid species, it superseded the no-jeopardy NMFS 2004 BiOp, which serves as the sole basis for NMFS's existing consultation on the SRS contracts. *Id.* ¶¶85-91, 118. The NMFS OCAP BiOp and amendments constitute "new information" requiring Reclamation to reinitiate consultation. 50 C.F.R. §402.16(b). Second, Reclamation's obligations are also triggered by the near-total mortality to two consecutive brood years of winter-run and spring-run Chinook caused by excessive deliveries to the SRS Contractors in 2014 and 2015, triggering mandatory reinitiation. 50 C.F.R. §402.16; 4SC ¶¶58-62, 119.

b. Plaintiffs' Section 9 claim

As outlined *supra*, Background section II.B, Plaintiffs are also likely to succeed on their proposed claim that Reclamation's deliveries, and the SRS Contractors' diversions, caused massive unauthorized take in 2014 and 2015 in violation of Section 9. 16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1)(B), (g); 4SC ¶151-55. These deliveries and diversions depleted the cold water reserve in Shasta Reservoir that was critical to the spawning, egg incubation, and rearing of the winter-run and spring-run broods. 4SC ¶58-62. As a result, Reclamation failed in its duty to control temperatures in the critical habitat for these species, causing near-total loss of the 2014 generation, and likely similar losses in 2015. *Id.* ¶58-62, 127.

Reclamation and the SRS Contractors caused take of winter-run and spring-run Chinook in violation of Section 9, 16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1)(B), (g), by "kill[ing]," "harm[ing]," and "harass[ing]" the species, *Id.* §1532(19). 4SC ¶127. Not only did the deliveries and diversions directly kill the species, they were "intentional or negligent act[s] or omission[s] which create the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavior patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. §17.3; 4SC ¶127. Further, they caused "significant habitat modification or degradation

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1	where it actually kills or injures w	vildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,		
2	including breeding, feeding, or sh	eltering." Id. As explained supra, Background section II.B,		
3	neither Reclamation nor the SRS	Contractors had authorization to take any winter-run or spring-		
4	run Chinook for the purpose of de	elivering or diverting water pursuant to the SRS contracts. See		
5	also 4SC ¶¶128-31.			
6 CONCLUSION				
7	For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant leave to file the propo			
8	Fourth Supplemental Complaint.			
9				
10		Respectfully submitted,		
11	DATED, Named and 2015			
12	DATED: November 9, 2015	By: <u>/s/ Barbara Jane Chisholm</u> Barbara Jane Chisholm		
13		KATHERINE POOLE (SBN 195010) DOUGLAS ANDREW OBEGI (SBN 246127)		
14		NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 111 Sutter Street, 20th Floor		
15		San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: (415) 875-6100		
16		Facsimile: (415) 875-6161 Attorneys for Plaintiff NRDC		
17		Miomeys for Luming MDC		
18		HAMILTON CANDEE (SBN 111376) BARBARA JANE CHISHOLM (SBN 224656)		
19		TONY LOPRESTI (SBN 289269) ALTSHULER BERZON LLP		
20		177 Post St., Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94108		
21		Telephone: (415) 421-7151 Facsimile: (415) 362-8064		
22		Attorneys for Plaintiff NRDC		
23		TRENT W. ORR (SBN 77656)		
24		EARTHJUSTICE 50 California St. Suite 500		
25		San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 217-2000		
26		Facsimile: (415) 217-2040 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and proposed Plaintiffs		
27				
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1	PROOF OF SERVICE					
2	CASE: NRDC v. Jewell, et al.					
3	CASE NO: U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Cal., Case No. 1:05-cv-01207 LJO-EPG					
4						
5	following with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Eastern District					
6						
7	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT					
8 9	All participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and will be served by the CM/ECF					
10	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this November 9, 2015, at San Francisco, California.					
11	/s/ Barbara Jane Chisholm					
12 13	Barbara Jane Chisholm					
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